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General Martin: ...Air Force heroes in the audience, all of them of course loggies, and I'm proud to join that crowd.

One of them that I know is here--I don't know if he's in the room today--of course, is an icon for the logistics business, General Leo Marquez. Is he here? Sir, it's good to see you.

[Applause]

I can't think of a more important award that an individual can win than a Marquez award.

But let me tell you a story about General Marquez. When you grow up and you get more senior in rank, you probably don't realize that there are a lot of people who remember you who you don't necessarily remember. So I'm one of those guys that happens to have a story about General Marquez that he may remember.

I was at the National War College. It was 1985. He was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Maintenance at the Pentagon. And, frankly--we're going to get into this--we changed the name of that organization several times. I've seen LE, I've seen LG, I've seen IL, I've seen lots of names. But at that time I think it was Logistics and Maintenance, but it could have been a different name.

He was there at the War College briefing all of the Air Force members, as each of the DCS general officers did on that particular day. It was service day, and each of the services went into different parts of the National Defense University and would hear pitches from their service leadership.

General Marquez was talking about the importance of logistics. Now, as he was walking on the stage and the stage had some steps, we didn't have these wireless mikes in those days and he was continually winding up or unwinding the cable that he was attached to while he was talking about the importance of logistics. And he was also talking about the fact that most people in our business spend an awful lot of time on weapon systems, spend an awful lot of time on tactics, techniques and procedures, spend a lot of time on the enemy order of battle and all those other things, but they spent very little time thinking about logistics. Yet when all was said and done, I think the

expressions you have are, "You can't fly without supply", "We pass gas", all those different terms [Laughter] that the loggies have -- "You ain't something if you aren't ammo" -- remember those? [Applause] Those people know that they make a difference in our ability to have combat capability and General Marquez was kind of reminding us of that.

I remember he said, "By the way, you talk an awful lot about something like AWACS being a force multiplier. But if you get used to a force multiplier and then for one reason or another it doesn't fly due to parts, maintenance, some sense of runway repair, all of a sudden that force multiplier that you have become heavily dependent on in combat operations becomes a force divider."

Think about it.

When the optical scanner goes down at the BX they don't know how to manually type the numbers in, it dies. And the lines build. It's a force divider. [Laughter]

He's winding the cable up, unwinding it. He said some of you are probably wondering why I am sort of infatuated with this cable that I'm winding up and back. It's because the impression you have of loggies is that if I were to not wind it up and I were to trip on it and fall you'd say, "Well, what do you expect from a loggie?" You remember that story, General Marquez? Almost 20 years ago. That had an impression on me about logistics.

And rather than thinking of logistics like a disease, like alcoholism -- Hi, I'm Greg Martin. I'm a loggie. [Laughter and Applause] Is that the way people introduce themselves? I'm a loggie?

Instead of thinking of them that way, let's think about what they really are. Let's think about the backbone they provide for our Air Force. And then let's take a look perhaps at the evolution of this thing we call logistics and then what I'll do is talk a little bit about the [mistakes] that we've had recently in the war, in the wars that we've fought, and some of the logistical implications there, or logistics implications.

First of all have you ever noticed -- You remember Lilly Tomlin. When she would give a presentation she never finished a -- But you knew exactly what she -- You know? [Laughter] Remember that?

Never finished a sentence but you knew what she was saying. That's the way people use the term logistics. When they really aren't sure what they want, what they mean, they'll say, "And that's a logistical issue." [Laughter] Just like we say

transformation, quality, enterprise -- [Laughter] -- infrastructure, architecture. [Applause]

We really don't know it specifically enough to give you very good information, but if we log it into that category you'll figure it out and that's what we do with logistics. You think I'm kidding.

Okay, let's take a look at definitions.

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This is what Webster's Dictionary says and it's probably the most complete. This is interesting. You have procurement, maintenance, transportation, military materiel facilities and personnel.

The joint definition. Be careful of joint definitions. Remember, it's a committee of people from different tribes who all have equities and basically will write something that says nothing and offends no one. [Applause]

I used to be on the Joint Staff so I can say that. [Laughter]

The fact is, don't let that happen. Make sure that what you write is something that will be useful and meaningful to people.

Then look at the last one. That's the unwashed logistician that says that. Through the right eyes, the right place, the right time.

Those are kind of the definitions. Let's try and translate those definitions, if you will, into organizations and see how we've done.

Let's go back a few years and just see, as I indicated earlier with the term VCSILLIG, perhaps maybe we've thought of logistics as a different animal at different times and it meant different things to different people.

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This is a typical SAC Wing of the '50s. I tried to highlight those things, if you go back to the key definition that Webster had, those things that perhaps were of logistical importance. I don't have everything in the wing there. You'll see later on a med group will show up. But it talks about the maintenance, it talks about the procurement, it talks about people, it talks about facilities, some of the activities they will need in terms of being able to accomplish their work. Those are logistical things. That's how we were structured in a

typical SAC Wing.

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Here's one in 1961. Here's how we had the structure at Langley Air Force Base. We had Deputy Commanders for Maintenance, Deputy Commanders for Operations instead of Logistics or Operations Groups or support groups. Again, a lot of people over in the air base group that do logistical type of things that aren't listed over here in the maintenance area.

In fact, wasn't this organization really established as the MOF?

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The 66-1 model. Again, the highlighted area is where logistics is. I think you can see particularly from that point on we really started to move these around a lot.

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The DCM. The Deputy Commander for Resources. Again, always trying to get a handle on what that logistics apparatus is and perhaps where it is best led and structured for our Air Force.

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The objective wing of course that we went through in the last decade.

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And then what we know today. And by the way, when you talk about people, you can't forget that the medical folks play an important role logistically as well in making sure that people are healthy and able to perform their duties. We want to make sure that the med group is not left out of this.

Now I think you can see that we've settled pretty close to the definition. Those things that are supporting our major operational activities are logistics and they should be put into an organization that is focused on that entire package of support.

There's one small aberration to our organization that we see today and the definition that we saw from Webster. That is we've decided that the art and science of maintenance is so detailed and so unique that we really need to focus on that as a separate activity as opposed to mixing it in with all the other logistics and support activities.

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If you think of this as I've tried to, in terms of a supporting/supported relationship that we talk an awful lot about these days when it comes to who's in charge, get the boxes right, make sure we know who is supporting, who is the shot caller. You take a look at left side of the chart and we've got the medical group supporting all of the people. And then you've got the support group providing all the support to include the majority of all of our logistical support for the people that are providing the final maintenance activities for the aircraft that are ultimately encompassed in the mission or the combat force, that could be your ground attack system or something else that is actually accomplishing that warfighting mission. So in a supporting to supported role from left to right you can see that logistics is the majority of any operation we have in any of our wings and in any of our combat forces that are going to go forward.

There were few people in the world that understood that over the history of warfare. Those that did were most successful. Those that didn't usually lost. I think now if you take a look at the structure that we have in our Air Force and you take it back 50 or 60 years and see the different puts and takes and different directions we've gone, I think we've gotten to about as close as the definition says, and probably from an organizational structural standpoint, about as close to what it takes to put that pointy end in the chest of your adversary as any time we've ever been structured.

So this is just one way of looking at what those definitions mean and how you might organizationally structure yourselves. We'll have to see how it all sorts out. We've just been into this for a year now and it will be another six months to a year before some of the people that were in different organizations PCS and the jobs that they used to do--that they kept doing because they thought it was important, because they're great great Americans--when they leave the new guy coming in won't know that job and there will be a couple of seams that will develop and we'll sort those out.

One of the good things about the combat wing organization we have today, as the Chief said--who I know you'll hear from later today--the Chief said we have about a zero percent chance of getting it 100 percent right first, and he's willing to take on the kinds of reviews it takes to make changes as we learn where the seams are.

But from a logistics standpoint, I think that's a pretty good organization. And by the way, now as the Commander of Air Force Materiel Command and a loggie and damn proud of it, I think this is something we all need to understand clearly from your

perspective, as the people who make our Air Force move: why we set it up that way, how you fit in, and how important it is to that right side of the chart, and success, that everything on the left side be focused, interconnected and working. I think we've got a good structure to do that.

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As we go through the rest of the pitch, think about this supporting/supported relationship. Think about it down at the shop level. Think about it at the squadron level and at the group level, but let me give you an example, and I'll show a couple of slides on it in a second but the slides are a little busy so let me just talk you through this.

An innovation has just recently occurred out here, at Tinker, at the depot there. As you know, this is engine city; the Oak City ALC has the majority of our Air Force engine responsibility. They're great, great Americans, not only military and Air Force civilians, but our contractors who support us as well, day in and day out on the most capable and most sophisticated engines in the world.

An engine will come in because it’s met its tac cycle period and it will get broken down. There will be a fairly initial review of the different parts and sections that have broken out. Many of those parts and sections will be sent off for cleaning and then into further reviews and different techniques of hopefully NDI (non-destructive inspection) assessment.

But what happens is you've got this engine team that breaks it down and immediately they will find parts that they know are unserviceable. Their responsibility then is to tag them, ultimately dispose of them, but then to order the replacement parts. And then as those things come in from either other places in the depot or from the manufacturer, they get routed to wherever that dock is and then they store them in a bin or an area, awaiting the parts for the rest of the engine to come back. Or if they've arranged it in such a way that they don't necessarily take one engine from cradle to grave, they'll apply them to the engine that they are working on.

What that means is that guy who's a specialist at tearing down and assembling engines, now sort of has to become a specialist at supply and sort of has to become a specialist in distribution, and he certainly meets the three days of fitness training by the training runs that he runs all over. They did a scatter diagram to determine how far those guys operate every day and it was somewhere around 15 miles, where they were moving out to one shop to pick up a part, taking another part over to go through an eddy-current or other form of NDI, and then ultimately bring it back for final assembly. That process, depending on

what was being done to the engine and how long you had to wait on a part, could take anywhere from a week to two months.

They looked at the amount of time a guy was spending doing something that was not related to his real skill set, and then the mistakes that might have been made in the ordering process that he was now responsible for. They said you know, it would seem as if we could build a cell that would be our supply experts and that these parts would come in, the engine mechanic would tag them and they would be put into a bin that goes into the supply area and they'd take care of all that. Then not only that, as the parts come back for the engine, they are the item accounts who assemble that and ultimately all of the parts that are awaiting the recovery of the major subsystems that needed additional work, repair and inspection, when they come back there's a nice, neat package of parts that all fit, that all go with that engine, and the maintenance team reassembles them and they move through the process pretty quick.

As a result we now have for the first time in history more engines for the F-15 fleet, the C/D fleet, than are required. Available. Forty-one, the last I saw at Langley Air Force Base. Huge, huge progress.

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This is kind of the way it looked. There's the shop. Depending on how they structured themselves they'd go through the business of breaking it down, ordering it, making a determination, running all over the place, bringing the parts back, put them into the storage bin while they're waiting for the engine to show up. Not nearly as clean an operation as you and I would like to see.

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So that kind of an operation. All the while they're doing engines.

Transformation while you're on the move is a very difficult thing to do. So my hat's off to the people at Tinker and our other logistics centers that are doing the same kinds of things that will make a difference for that guy on the right side of the screen that we were talking about earlier. Terrific work by some terrific professionals. Many of those professionals are in this room, so my hat's off to you all. That's important stuff.

Don't think this happens at the AFMC level or that it happens at General Zettler's level. Yeah, there are things we can do to help. There are some ideas we may have. But the majority of the good ideas are at the shop level where the people know the job, know the work. Sometimes they need a little bit of

encouragement, a little bit of horsepower to help them over the hump to make a project go from an area that's doing okay but sort of looks like a dog's breakfast to a place that you'd be glad to show any American or any foreign visitor who comes to see how you do business in the world's greatest air and space force.

You all should be very proud of the teams that we have working for us and, as I mentioned with the F-100 engine, historic success. So my hat's off to all of you.

Let me now go into the next phase, if you will. We're beginning I think to get a better handle and understanding of our purchasing and supply chain management, of our ability to take work out of the process and be more productive with people. We're not there; we've got a lot of work to do. We've got facilities that need to be reconstructed, need to be recapitalized. We'll get through that, but I think we have a pretty good vector.

The question is now: what are the next things we as an Air Force should be doing, particularly from a logistics perspective, to prepare ourselves for the next time that we're engaged in a major combat operation? And to improve the people that we have on the front lines today doing combat in Iraq or in Afghanistan or potentially in the Balkans or other places where we've got troops that are trying to maintain peace.

Many of you will recall that during Operation Allied Force, General Ryan was the Chief of Staff. About 45 days into the conflict, he asked that we establish the Air War Over Serbia study. He assigned that responsibility to Brigadier General John Corley who was taken at that time out of Davis-Monthan where he was wing commander, brought up to Washington, formed a team, and then moved over to Ramstein in August of 1999. The idea was for them to gather all the data they could gather, to review it, sift through it, interview, talk to people that had been engaged in that 78-day war, and understand what the key lessons were that we should pay attention to. The report came out about a year later, in August of 2000. It's a big report. It's about a 500-page report plus the volumes that go below it to literally give you thousands and thousands of pages of data. To include all the mission reports and all of the air tasking orders, everything that had to do with that war that we could find is stored in this AWOS series of volumes.

But the capstone document is about a 500-page document. It looks a little like a phone book, and it's classified. I had been around the Air Force awhile. By the way I was in USAFE then so General Corley worked for me as we finished up this project on a war that I saw from Washington but now was seeing pretty close up and personal with General Corley as he went through all of this information.

What I was concerned about was, as I have been concerned for many times, the after-action reports tend to become coffee table ornaments. This, of course, would be a coffee table ornament in a vault. [Laughter] But nonetheless, a coffee table ornament.

After General Corley delivered the report, we took a team and boiled down as quickly as we could the thousands and thousands of recommendations and suggestions. Most of them were of a checklist formation. If we get to one of these, don't forget you need to have overflight clearance. If you're going to do basing beddown, you need to establish teams that can go out and do site surveys quick. Those are interesting things, those are continuity folder or checklist items that you can have at the battle staff. They aren't necessarily requiring a movement of resources or a structuring of your Air Force. But there were about 150 items that did require some Air Force action, commitment of resources, a new technique, a new organizational structure, or something like that. We boiled that down to about 15, as I recall.

Then what we did was we took five of those to Corona Fall which was in October of 2000, and we briefed those as the AWOS Nuggets. The reason we did that was we didn't want all that effort that had been put into the study, after all that effort had been put into winning the war, to be lost if there were some things we could do better the next time. As you all know, you never know when the next time will be. It was 18 years from Vietnam, the final termination of Vietnam, until we had Desert Storm. Then since Desert Storm we've had five conflicts. So you have to be working this problem every day. We wanted to make sure the Air Force didn't lose sight of that.

Now the five nuggets dealt with things I'm proud to say the Air Force is really working hard. The first one is getting real-time information into the cockpit so that an airplane like the B-2 that was on a 17-hour sortie over and 17 hours back would be able to get a new battlespace picture, do some retargeting, would know where the friendlies were, those sorts of things, as they were trekking across the ocean. Real-time information to the C-17s that are in harm's way getting ready to drop food into Afghanistan. We didn't know about Afghanistan yet, but those are the thoughts that people had.

Second, we needed to develop technologies that would complement stealth. You can continue to develop stealth to the next degree and there will continue to be people who will counter you, but you can already make the stealth you have even more effective if you develop some technologies that will enhance it, which we are doing.

We wanted to be able to have more precise, smaller weapons

with discreet effects because there were many times that the precision weapons we had would cause more collateral damage than we could accept and yet the target needed to be killed. So, discreet effect weapons to achieve the effect that we want.

We needed to engage our senior leaders, both in the military and interagency in our wargames and our exercises. Oftentimes that gets delegated to the lower crowd. I think you'll find now that's not true. We engage at the three- and four-star level. In fact when we participate with the Army we're asked now to have a general officer every time the Army does their BPTP to make sure that there's an airman there with a certain amount of rank, experience and credibility to represent air correctly.

Last, we knew the structure of the command and control above the wing level was inadequate. We could put together the CAOC at Vicenza, but it wasn't there always. And the people that had the spin-up time had to be trained. So the AOC as a weapon system is a part of that.

So there's great value to taking a look at what you have just accomplished, what you can do better, and then putting it in front of you every day and working towards it.

So let's, for the next couple of minutes, show you if we were to look back to Operation Desert Storm and then roll forward through the next five conflicts, a series of actions that are probably what I would say for an airman, keystone lessons that we should pay attention to.

Now what will happen is that it will stay on the screen. We're going to modify them, improve them or add to them as each conflict goes on. It's a little bit busy, but the reason I'm doing this is, you all will get copies of the charts and every now and then it's useful to look at that and see if anything you're doing is enhancing some of the systems that we said needed to be worked.

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Let's take a look here. We learned the value of the single air tasking order. We had never had that before. We didn't have it in Vietnam, didn't have it in other places. The single air tasking order, and I think that's pretty well institutionalized and most people believe that today.

Being able to conduct parallel operations -- at the strategic level, at the operational level, at the tactical level. We were conducting operations at all levels of war, on the ground, in the air. Pretty important stuff. We had not done that before.

The importance of the Air Operations Center. To be able to develop the ATO, to have a single place where we could have the data, the picture, and the information needed to make not only the plan but then make dynamic retasking actions as time went on.

The need for all-weather precision strike. Remember we were using laser-guided bombs off of several aircraft, but primarily the F-117, but they were not all-weather. We went to work on that pretty quick. As you know, the JDAM of course came about.

The thing about the JDAM you have to be careful about is it doesn't bomb targets, it bombs coordinates. We just hope there's a target there. [Laughter] If it's a fixed target it's there, but if it's moving it's not. So we're looking for precision weapons that actually go in after targets to achieve the effect, not just coordinates. But coordinates is good enough given nobody else could do it and they were very, very accurate.

I think you all recall General Schwarzkopf talking about theater response and intel. All the intel went somewhere else, got filtered, and then he got his take which may not have given him the information he needed and wasn't very timely. You know that we've worked that pretty hard. It's not clean yet, but pretty hard.

Then we started to get into some of your stuff. We set up bases there and it took us a long time to build the bases, so we needed to look very hard at the things that contributed to our footprint and what could we do to relieve that.

We also need to be able to deploy very rapidly and account for all of our stuff that was going.

Those aren't necessarily all the lessons, but that's a pretty good sample of it.

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Now we get into Operation Deliberate Force. Remember, that was a two-and-a-half week bombing campaign. General Ryan ran that when he was the 15th Air Force Commander and it was against the Serbian forces that were operating in Bosnia and killing people regularly. It brought Milosevic to the Dayton Accords and the entry of forces into Bosnia back in 1995.

The same lessons, except now less footprint, more rapid deployment. Because, as that force was moving, it had to move very quickly in order to be in place. It was a fairly quick spinup, as you all recall.

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We go to Operation Allied Force. I'm sort of highlighting now those areas that you all are probably most familiar with. Less footprint, rapid deployment, and by the way when you start to stretch out the length of the pipeline, how long does it take to get reparables back into the system? You can set up centralized intermediate repair activities or facilities in this case for engines, for major avionics, which was done in Europe. And by the way, was also done earlier but we didn't capture that as necessarily one of those things you always do. It's something we now think about at the beginning of our planning cycle.

Now there were some other things that changed there as time goes on. You're going from all-weather now to all-weather/all-altitude. I haven't shown all the changes, but this chart continues to build.

We operated out of 26 bases in Operation Allied Force. Think of the site survey teams it took.

When you listen to the reports back from Allied Force I think most people will remember that one, gosh, Milosevic didn't collapse as fast as we thought he would. That's one lesson.

Two, we remember hearing about the infamous VTC, the discussion between General Clark and General Short on priorities and how to use air power.

We remember we didn't insert ground forces. Did you ever hear there wasn't a bomb where you needed it? Did you ever hear that we didn't have medical supplies where we needed them? The ATO didn't get there? Couldn't communicate? No fuel, no water, no food? A piece of cake.

I think General Gabreski was in charge of the A-4 activity. She can tell you what a piece of cake, but you never saw it in the newspaper because our loggies made it all happen. But there are a lot of things we can do better, particularly when you start to think about 26 bases, 14 of which we'd never operated out of before, across countries -- establish a base, setting it up, setting the comm, setting munitions, fuel bladders, all the kinds of things it takes to run a combat operation that went seamlessly because of some incredible professionals. But I will tell you that the duck's feet were still paddling when I got over there nine months later because these people were working very hard at what it takes to sustain a combat operation force.

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Operation Enduring Freedom. Again, less footprint, more rapid deployment. Ability to stand up quickly and operate and sustain operations from a large number of bases.

You take Operation Enduring Freedom --

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-- and then go into Operation Iraqi Freedom -- 36 bases at one time that we were operating out of. Thirty-six bases. Most of them there, most of them requiring everything to be brought in by air. Meaning global access to get there, meaning incredible mobility forces and planning, to get it there and sustain operations that wanted to be on the front line taking down the enemy.

So as we think about the wars --

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-- that we've had here. The common thread that you'll see in five conflicts in the last 12 years are, those are my thoughts about what we probably ought to pay attention to in the years ahead, and you can see that global access business and of course the ability to rapidly stand up and sustain operations from bases is pretty critical, and that's your business. Whether it be maintaining those aircraft that are flying, which is as Webster said a part of logistics or the entire infrastructure it takes to sustain that maintenance and that operational activity. That is your business. It's a big deal. A big, big deal.

What's next?

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Here are some thoughts.

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Number one, more lethality per weapon system is going to reduce the number of weapon systems and hence the number of weapons that you need.

I remember the first time I saw this F-117 do its thing. I said golly, that's a lot of money and a long way to go to only carry two bombs. I was used to an F-4 or an F-15 that would carry 24. The difference was, they hit the target. [Laughter] Twice. [Laughter]

I flew in Vietnam where we didn't hit the target twice, with 400 weapons sometimes. So it's not the size of the force, it's the effect. And the more lethal, like the B-2 now being able to drop 80 independently targeted weapons at once, is going to reduce the footprint you take forward because they're going to take the targets down faster than we've ever been able to do it before, with less force, less movement. Pretty amazing.

There's a lot of emphasis on that, which helps your business a lot.

Of course the more reliability the less we have to put into our MRSTs (Materiel Readiness Support Teams) and then hence the less load planning, less airlift, all of those sorts of things which then offers that up to other forces. And by the way, let's not forget that when the major combat operations are over there is a sizeable force of United States and coalition members left on the ground that need to continue to be supported. Usually United States Army, often United States Marine Corps, and airmen are with them and continuing to sustain that operation is just as important.

Electronic TOs (Technical Orders). Updated electronic, maybe no paper at all. Maybe headset and voice instruction and video pictures of how to do the job instead of written words that perhaps some of us don't know how to read.

It's absolutely important that we have seamless integration of our strategic and in-theater movements. In order to do that we've got to have flawless in-transit visibility so that you're getting the stuff to the right place at the right time and it's getting to the foxhole or two where the weapon system is.

Then of course the faster we can get the system to know what's needed and respond, the better off. So the more we can decentralize that process and make it obvious what the needs are, the faster the system can respond. I think we've seen that in industry today.

So if we take a look at your business and we take a look at our success, there is no question that the United States Air Force rides on the back of our loggies. So I am Greg Martin, I am a loggie and damn proud of it.

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[Applause]

Questions?

Q: [Inaudible]

A: It's not very glamorous. We fund the glamorous things. And by the way, we funded some pretty important things and we've done very well at them, but let's face it. The electronic TO is more than a computer and a CRT. It's the entire TO process and that's been underfunded. In fact a week ago we had a very significant meeting at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha between the combat air forces commanders and the mobility air forces

commanders. One of the topics we talked about was the next generation of our technical order processing system.

I recall in the '80s, late '80s, I was pulling money out of sustaining engineering and pulling money out of TOs and the two are pretty important because it's the sustaining engineers that ultimately engineer not only the materials you use but then the procedures you use to install new stuff or to fix our aircraft. So that's been woefully underfunded over the past 15 years, as have the TOs.

Now in order to do electronic TOs you've got to get the paper TOs up to speed first or you've got to at least get the process to where you can convert; you update the TOs in the electronic form as you're bringing all the rest of that aircraft's system onto the technical order database that you're designing. And how best to do that?

Do you have a base data centralized computer that's got all the data? Do you do it on a ROM and send it out? Do you do a centralized database at the SPD and everybody RASs (Remote Access Server) in and updates their computer every day with warnings that tell you which items have changed? We haven't yet agreed on that process. And again, in terms of the time it takes for us to develop the appropriate fix on the installation or fix procedures, to institutionalize that, we have not in my view taken the time to go from end to end and then devote the resources to fixing it.

So what we've done is we've moved forward in some of the electronic areas, some of the new aircraft coming on have the electronic TOs. The others we're still struggling with green pages and changes and trying to convert over to the JCALS (Joint Computer-aided Acquisition and Logistic Support) and ETIMS (Enhanced Technical Information Management Information System) systems. But when all is said and done, we did not put the resources and focus on it that we needed and we're behind.

It's an area I'm pretty passionate about. That's why we brought the briefing to the CAF/MAF conference. They all agree it needs to be done. It is the infrastructure of our weapon system capability and now what we'll do is we'll take a look at the money we've already committed over the next five years, and is there a better way to focus in on those things that will get us the electronic capability fastest.

I hope that answers your question. A long way to go but critical to our Air Force and we've got to do it right.

Q: General Martin, do you have a [inaudible]?

A: No. [Laughter and Applause]

I just joined LOA yesterday. [Laughter] And the name is Speedy, but not that speedy.

Frankly, I don't. I haven't given it enough thought. I think General Zettler probably does and he and I are working and talking. They've got a pretty important effort going on that I think you'll hear about shortly, the eLog21 (Expeditionary Logistics for the 21st Century). I'm coming up to speed on it.

But frankly, right now no, I don't have what that vision is in a way that I can articulate it. But I do know this, that there's a lot of thought being given to it. I think General Zettler can probably give you that information. I think Mike will talk about it later. He's trying desperately to educate me.

Remember, I came from a fighters so I need cartoons and comic books. [Laughter]

But I'll do it electronically. [Laughter] I'll do the cartoons and comic books electronically. [Laughter]

Anybody else?

Q: [Inaudible]

A: Yes, until I was the incumbent. Absolutely.

One of the things, I'm not sure everybody heard the question. The question was: in my former role when I was in USAFE and during Operation Iraqi Freedom USAFE was in a supporting role. We had set up an organization, the 16th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force under General Moorehead that moved to Turkey and their job was to sustain all of the forces that were in the northern part of the theater or coming from the north. As many of you know, we didn't get nearly as many forces into Turkey as we wanted but they let us overfly so we were coming from Romania and Bulgaria, Cypress, Sigonella, Moron, and he was actually the guy that was responsible for orchestrating that effort for General Moseley.

My job was to support General Moseley with USAFE assets and to make sure that we were connected back to Washington and to the other commands for things we needed to support that effort.

We did that in two ways. One, in terms of supporting Moorehead, and second in supporting the flow-through of stuff that went further down-range to the southern part of General Moseley's air forces.

We had daily VTCs. We had, I believe, a decentralized structure. You can correct me if I'm wrong; we had a support

force that was dedicated at USAFE to supporting 16th AETF. I think I can count on one hand the number of issues that came up that I had to be involved in. Most of the work I did was trying to keep up with what was going to happen next, which is exactly what I thought I should be doing because you guys were at the pointy end of the spear to execute it. So to answer your question, I think I got all the information I needed either in the message reports that were coming or from the VTCs and I think the system did what it was supposed to do for you.

Now you have to be the one that says "Well, not quite, General. We lied to you, we just didn't call your baby ugly. [Laughter] You can still have a career. [Laughter]

Yes, General Marquez.

Q: [Inaudible].

A: [Laughter] Yes, sir. [Laughter]

Let me talk about that whole picture for a second if I could. This is a major change. We have a major change going on right now in Air Force Materiel Command and within the acquisition community led, as you know, by our Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Dr. Sambur. It's typically called the PEO Restructure Memo that the Chief and the Secretary signed out a couple of months ago.

But if you go back to two things that were happening at the same time and then look at what happened, you can see the need for this restructure.

The first time I ever heard the term overrun that didn't apply to a runway was the C-5. That was a sensational expose, as you all recall. From then on you would hear sensational exposes -- the $600 hammer, the $1000 coffee pot, and all those sorts of things. Over a period of time and several studies dealing with how to do acquisition better, it first became codified in the Goldwater/Nichols Act that talked about the acquisition chain and who would be responsible. Because heretofore, for the most part Systems Command and to an extent for major modifications the Logistics Command, had a military structure, generally, that built the programs, the acquisition baselines and all of that for our weapon system. And they did pretty well, but the sensational events happened often enough for people to say wait a minute, how come civilians aren't in charge? Well, they were. But they weren't throughout the process. They were at the approval process but they weren't down in the noise level day in and day out. So part of Goldwater/Nichols changed that and set up our acquisition chain.

With that came other things. We did the Packard Commission

and its recommendations. We did the DAWIA, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, and that began to codify some very, very strict rules and procedures that we used in terms of our acquisition responsibilities.

At the same time that was going on we were in the drawdown from Operation Desert Storm. We decided we were going to do away with the Air Force Systems Command and the Air Force Logistics Command and we were going to create this new thing called the Air Force Materiel Command. And when we did that we were going to have single face to the customer, cradle-to-grave management. Those are the words; I recall them well. I was at Eglin Air Force Base, which at that time was a Systems Command Base, but I was in the 33rd Wing, receiving, by the way, great support from the people there at Systems Command.

So that was the by-line. Single face to the customer and cradle-to-grave management.

What actually happened as time went on was the Air Force Materiel Command, with all of the infrastructure to be able to support programs success: our test and evaluation capability, telemetry, airspace, all of our wind tunnels, all of our science and engineers, all of our S&T, all of our facilities, if you will, to support program directors began to become separated from the acquisition chain. They were not necessarily included in the program reviews yet they had all the infrastructure to be turned loose on the acquisition programs that might need that sensitive engineering, that wind tunnel test, or that particular piece of data that seemed to be awfully slow getting to the program office.

So with the PEO restructure, you've now asked the PEOs to move out of Washington and that position to also become the center commander. Therefore the individual responsible for program success was also the person who commands the infrastructure that supports the program.

So when he or she gets ready to go forward with a program that's a dog, the first question that's going to be asked is "Well, what kind of capability do you have to fix this program?" That person will have already looked at that and hopefully we'll begin to see over the next several years, program success brought about by the fact that you have unity of command.

Now at the same time he's doing that you've got your log centers that are not only doing depot maintenance, they're doing all the supply management and they're doing all the sustaining engineering and oftentimes the modification engineering. That too will now be commanded by a single individual and that operation, we think as we continue to define and refine the process, will improve their ability to work on sustaining

engineering activities with all of the resources in the product centers to be turned on to them when they do developmental activities.

So General Marquez, our concept here was to get us back into a force where we number one don't do PMRT (program management responsibility transfer) between one command and another and then go through all the frustrations of not getting labor forces to come with you and all that. Put it under unity of command and now the question is "What are the schools that we need people to go to? What are the supply schools? What are the maintenance schools? What are the log planning schools? And what are the acquisition schools?" Because right now it's a acquisition-centric level certification issue as opposed to a logistics or in this case a materiel education and certification level.

So I will take that on and make sure that we've thought through the entire education and training activity and that we're exposing people to the full picture. What we hoped to do, I think, was when we trained people in the acquisition anomaly, contracting and all of that sort of stuff, we just sort of assumed that the people that were going to plan for depot maintenance, for field maintenance, for supply, and all of that, would do their normal professional thing and we'd send them to the acquisition business, and that the acquisition manager would rely totally on them without necessarily knowing their business. The fact is I think you need to know that business and we have to do some force development cross-flow as well.

We are looking very hard at force development or cross-flow because, to my way of thinking, a person who is an acquisition person wearing the uniform that has not been in an operational activity doesn't necessarily represent the people that they're providing the product to very well. Even though they have uniforms and have a certain amount of credibility in the process outside of the Air Force, they are not necessarily winning and aware of the problems they're trying to solve for the user in the field.

So my thought is that we ought to move those people probably twice in their career at the right time for them to actually have hands-on work in the kinds of things that the acquisition program is trying to provide.

There's also a time when people from the field will come in and backfill them and they will then become more aware of what the acquisition and logistics processes are that are available to them when they're in the field and they need help. So that cross-flow I think will be a fairly major activity that we will pursue in the next year.

You have to take a 20-year look at this because it will be five to ten years before the payoffs begin to bear fruit, and then you've got to think in terms of 20 years for whether that affected an individual's promotion opportunity and opportunity for positions of responsibility. I'm convinced it will help them; I'm convinced it will help our Air Force, so we've got that on our plate.

Anyone else?

[No response]

Let me just say again to all of you who are here, this is a tremendous opportunity. First, you've got great displays out there, many of you were a part of. Your industry partners are there as well. You are conversing and dialoguing with each other in a way that is very, very important to our Air Force. You will form some friendships that will make a difference when you're at the right side of that chart one of these days.

But more important than all of that is you are hopefully hearing, as I've seen the agenda of speakers, from the people in this Air Force that are trying their very best to do what will make you more effective than we were as you move up the ladder and take over this Air Force, which is in better shape than it was when I came in, in 1970. And it will be in better shape 20 years than now from your leadership and your dedication and your professionalism.

So I congratulate all of you for what you have done for our Air Force, what you are going to do, and for the work that you are doing today. And I hope that throughout this association conference you have a chance to not only have a little fun, but put your brain on the future because ultimately you're going to lead us to that point on the horizon that we know as the future.

Thank you all, and God bless you.

[Applause]

(END)